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Abstract	  
Land	  value	  capture	  policies	  –	  that	  aim	  at	  recovering	  the	  unearned	  increments	  accrued	  by	  urban	  plans	  
or	  public	  investments	  –	  have	  been	  increasingly	  used	  by	  planners	  and	  local	  decision	  makers	  –	  due	  to	  
shrinking	   incomes	   from	  traditional	   fiscal	   sources,	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  and	  to	   the	  need	  to	  catch	  other	  
instruments	  to	  fund	  local	  infrastructures,	  on	  the	  other.	  This	  betterment	  recovery	  may	  be	  processed	  
either	  through	  fiscal	  instruments	  (taxes,	  contributions,	  or	  exactions),	  or	  through	  local	  improvements	  
on	  the	  general	  behalf	  of	  communities	  (namely	  through	  infrastructure	  provision).	  
Many	  countries	  all	  over	   the	  world	  –	  namely	  Brazil,	  Argentina,	  Colombia,	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  
Canada,	  China,	  Taiwan,	  Hong	  Kong,	  Singapore,	  India,	  United	  Kingdom,	  France,	  Denmark,	  Poland	  and	  
other	  European	  countries	  -­‐	  have	  implemented	  indirect	  value	  capture	  instruments,	  in	  order	  to	  recover	  
the	  unearned	  increments	  straightly	  linked	  to	  public	  investments,	  thus	  supporting	  new	  developed	  or	  
re-­‐developed	   areas	   (Gielen	   and	   van	   der	   Krabben,	   2017).	   These	   include	   improvements	   or	   impact	  
contributions,	   special	   assessments,	   and	   urban	   development	   charges.	   These	   instruments	   –	   called	  
developer	  obligations	  -­‐	  consist	  in	  requesting	  developers	  or	  real	  estate	  promoters	  the	  payment	  -­‐	  as	  a	  
setback	   for	   certain	   licensed	   building	   levels	   or	   land-­‐use	   regulation	   decisions	   by	   urban	   plans	   (that	  
potentially	   rises	   the	   value	   of	   their	   property)	   -­‐	   of	   part	   of	   the	   infrastructure	   costs	   associated	   to	   a	  
certain	   urban	   development	   undertaking,	   or	   provision	   of	   certain	   facilities,	   construction	   or	   other	  
benefits	  (on	  a	  per	  square	  meter	  basis	  or	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  surface	  building),	  in	  order	  to	  compensate	  
the	  community´s	  social	  costs	   for	  such	  urban	  development	  changes	   (Bowers,	  1992,	  Webster,	  1998).	  
Value	   capture	   based	   on	   urban	   plans	   is	   flexible,	   transparent,	   and	   accountable,	   and	   render	   urban	  
developments	   easier.	   These	   instruments	   are	   generally	   upwards,	   arising	   from	  policies	   developed	  at	  
local	  grounds	  and	  for	  specific	  undertakings.	  Thus,	  they	  are	  more	  flexible,	  noticeable	  and	  adaptable	  to	  
communities´	  preferences,	  and	  they	  don´t	  discourage	  urban	  development	  processes.	  Non-­‐negotiable	  
devoloper	  obligations	  are	  enforced	  through	  national	  or	  regional	  legislation,	  and	  can	  be	  implemented	  
through	  local	  policies.	  
Within	   this	   framework,	   the	   research	   herein	   reported	   presents	   the	   theoretical	   framework,	  
methodology,	   results	   and	   conclusions	   of	   a	   proposal	   of	   a	   kind	   of	   non-­‐negotiable	   development	  
obligation	   -­‐	   applied	   at	   the	  Municipal	   level	   -­‐	   aimed	  at	   capturing	   at	   least	   part	   of	   the	   land	  unearned	  
increments	   engendered	   by	   plans	   (concerning	   the	   allocation	   of	   concrete	   building	   capacities).	   This	  
work	  was	  developed	  as	  a	  research	  and	  consultancy	  work	  for	  the	  Portuguese	  Territory	  Department	  (a	  
governmental	  organism)	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  revision	  of	  the	  Land	  Planning	  Act	  (Lei	  31/2014)	  and	  
complementary	  legislation,	  namely	  the	  new	  Juridical	  Regime	  of	  Urbanization	  and	  Edification,	  and	  the	  
new	  Juridical	  Regime	  of	  Territorial	  Management	  Instruments.	  
It	   founds	   on	   an	   economic-­‐financial	   assessment	   that	   consists	   in	   charging	   landowners/promoters	   a	  
20%	   fee	   on	   land	   betterments	   that	   result	   from	   the	   assignment	   by	   urban	   plans	   of	   specific	   building	  
capacities	   to	  urban	   interventions	  especially	   targeted	   to	  high-­‐profitable	   tourism	  uses.	  The	  proposed	  
methodology	  is	  applied	  to	  the	  Urban	  Development	  Plan	  of	  the	  Planning	  Unit	  11	  of	  the	  municipality	  of	  
Lagoa,	  located	  in	  the	  Algarve,	  Portugal.	  
A	  deep	  reflection	  has	  been	  pursued,	  and	  a	  new	  paradigm	  has	  emerged	  on	  the	  economic	  and	  financial	  
sustainability	   of	   urban	   development	   processes,	   and	   technical	   studies	   are	   now	   being	   required	   for	  
plans´	  approval.	  Besides,	  as	  the	  current	  crisis	  framework	  strongly	  impacts	  on	  municipal	  finance,	  this	  
research	   aims	  at	   contributing	   to	   endow	  municipalities	  with	   financing-­‐efficient	   instruments,	   able	   to	  
reinforce	  their	  ability	  to	  fight	  for	  their	  populations´	  interests.	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These	  non-­‐negotiable	  development	  obligations	  may	  be	  easily	  applied	  to	  other	  municipalities,	  within	  
the	  scope	  of	  different	  kinds	  of	  urban	  plans,	  thus	  ensuring	  that	  betterments	  are	  objectively	  pointed	  to	  
cover	  costs	  of	  infrastructure	  and	  facilities´	  provision.	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Land	  prices	  rise	  mainly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  public	  interventions	  and	  planning	  decisions,	  namely	  concerning	  
the	  development	  and	  implementation	  of	  territorial	  plans,	  changes	  in	  urban	  land	  use	  or	  use	  intensity,	  
or	  investments	  in	  urban	  infrastructure	  (Alterman	  2010,	  2011;	  Walters,	  2012a,	  2012b).	  	  
Many	   authors	   argue	   that	   part	   of	   this	   land	   value	   that	   accrue	   from	   planning	   decisions	   should	   be	  
captured	   and	   applied	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   overall	   community	   (Netzer,	   1998;	   Ingram	   and	   Hong,	   2007;	  
Smolka	  and	  D.	  Amborski	  ,	  2007;	  Rebelo,	  2009,	  2012).	  
Within	  a	  scope	  of	  economic	  and	  financial	  crisis,	  municipal	  decision	  makers	  increasingly	  resort	  to	  land	  
value	  capture	   instruments	  as	  means	  to	  overcome	  and	  balance	  shrinking	  revenues	  proceeding	   from	  
traditional	  local	  taxes	  (Ingram	  and	  Hong,	  2007,	  2012;	  Ko	  and	  B.	  Rosenblatt,	  2013).	  
Land	   value	   capture	   may	   be	   pursued	   through	   taxes,	   contributions,	   or	   regulations	   (Smolka	   and	  
Amborski,	   2003).	   The	   use	   of	   fiscal	   instruments	   shape	   urban	   development	   (Correia,	   1993),	   as	   they	  
exert	  a	  considerable	  effect	  on	  market	  performance	  and	  land	  uses,	  so	  they	  influence	  the	  achievement	  
of	   planning	   goals.	   Their	   efficiency	  may	   be	   assessed	   from	   their	   consequences	   on	   planning	   and	   on	  
urban	   development	   funding	   (DGOTDU,	   2011).	   Taxation	   of	   land	   betterment	   values	   ensures	   public	  
administration	  an	  alternative	  source	  of	  income	  (beyond	  the	  traditional	  taxes),	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  
returns	  back	  to	  the	  social	  interest	  the	  increases	  in	  land	  values	  that	  accrue	  from	  public	  decisions,	  on	  
the	  other.	  
The	   revision	  of	   the	   territorial	  planning	  and	  urban	  development	   legal	   framework	   is	   currently	   taking	  
place	  in	  Portugal.	  The	  new	  Land	  and	  Planning	  Act	  (Law	  nº	  31/2014)	  is	  already	  enforced,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
new	  Juridical	  Regime	  of	  Urbanization	  and	  Edification	  (DL	  nº	  136/2014),	  and	  the	  new	  juridical	  regime	  
of	   territorial	  planning	   instruments	   (DL	  nº	  80/2015).	  This	   revision	  refer	   to	   the	  general	  basis	  of	   land,	  
territorial	  ordering	  and	  urban	  development	  public	  policies,	  and	  became	  absolutely	  necessary	  due	  to	  
previous	   urban	   sprawl,	   difficult	   control	   upon	   urban	   land	   markets,	   excessive	   weight	   of	   land	   on	  
housing	   final	   costs,	   and	   property	   betterment	   values	   that	   accrued	   from	   planning	   decisions	   wholy	  
appropriated	   by	   landowners.	   The	   experience	   with	   the	   previous	   territorial	   management	   system	  
revealed	   that:	   instruments	   hardly	   fitted	   new	   territorial	   dynamics,	   their	   elaboration,	   revision	   and	  
execution	  were	   extremely	  dilatory,	   different	   rules	   from	  different	   plans	  were	  hardly	   applicable	   and	  
articulated	  on	  specific	  territories	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  territorial	  development	  at	  higher	  than	  municipal	  
scale;	   land	  occupation	  was	  over	  regulated	  by	  master	  plans	  and	   lacked	  development	  strategies,	  and	  
monitoring	  and	  assessment	  of	  territorial	  management	  instruments	  was	  scarce. 
The	   main	   goals	   of	   the	   new	   Land	   and	   Planning	   Act	   consist	   in:	   urban	   space	   containment	   and	  
rehabilitation,	   match	   of	   regulations	   together	   on	   a	   single	   plan,	   intermunicipal	   cooperation,	   more	  
flexibility	  in	  territorial	  planning,	  assignment	  of	  new	  intervention	  modes	  to	  municipalities,	  support	  to	  
economic	  and	   financial	   sustainability	   in	   land	  uses,	   settlement	  of	  equal	  distribution	  mechanisms	   for	  
charges	   and	   benefits,	   oppose	   urban	   speculation,	   the	   overgrowth	   of	   urban	   perimeters	   and	  
uncontroled	   real	   estate	   price	   rises,	   regulation	   over	   land	   valuation,	   and	   regular	   assessment	   and	  
revision	  of	  plans	  and	  programes.	  
The	  current	  Law	  adds	  an	  economic	  and	  financial	  regime	  to	  previously	  enforced	  legislation.	  It	  indeed	  
supports	  land	  use	  sustainability	  through:	  the	  anticipation	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  financial	  feasibility	  of	  
proposed	   urban	   operations,	   settlement	   of	   a	   municipal	   fund	   for	   urban	   and	   environmental	  
sustainability	   fed	   by	   the	   reassignment	   of	   betterment	   values,	   statement	   in	   territorial	   plans	   of	  
betterment	   creation	   and	   definition	   of	   respective	   parameters	   and	   redistribution	   criteria,	   and	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compensation	   for	   the	   general	   social	   interest	   in	   benefits´and	   charges	   reassignment.	   Thus	   territorial	  
plans	   should	   reinforce	   their	   strategic	   character,	   weigh	   respective	   juridical	   land	   feasibility,	  
environmental	  and	  social	  cohesion,	  and	  economic	  and	  financial	  sustainability,	  and	  present	  as	  well	  an	  
estimation	   of	   public	   investments	   capacities	   in	   territorial	   planning	   proposals.	   They	   should	   explicitly	  
settle	  the	  average	  land	  lending	  for	  equal	  distribution,	  define	  local	  economic	  development	  goals	  and	  
municipal	   intervention	   measures	   on	   land	   markets,	   pursue	   monitoring,	   and	   detail	   execution	  
programs.	  These	  attributes	  should	  be	  scrutinised	  and	  implemented	  through	  detail	  plans.	  	  	  
As	   far	  as	   the	  contents	  of	   territorial	  plans	  and	  programs	  are	  concerned,	   the	  new	  Land	  and	  Planning	  
Act	  requires	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  assessment	  indicators	  in	  plans;	  as	  well	  as	  the	  identification	  
of	  the	  financial	  means	  for	  different	  time	  horizons,	  execution	  plans	  and	  financial	  schedules.	  
In	  what	  specificaly	  concerns	  the	  economic	  and	  financial	  regime,	  territorial	  plans	  and	  programs	  should	  
clearly	   identify	   betterment	   values,	   and	   settle	   objetive	   parameters	   and	   assessment	   criteria.	  
Municipalities	  should	  further	  develop	  urban	  developments	  funding	  program	  (that	  includes	  the	  pluri-­‐
annual	   municipal	   investment	   program	   in	   infrastructure).	   The	   urban	   operations	   laid	   down	   in	  
municipal	   or	   intermunicipal	   plans	   should	   ensure	   infrastructure,	   equipment	   and	   public	   spaces´	  
execution	  and	  funding,	  and	  the	  plan	  should	  define	  the	  required	  urban	  development	  works	  and	  the	  
proportional	  participation	  of	  the	  different	  stakeholders	   in	   its	   funding,	  as	  well	  as	  real	  estate	   lending	  
for	   certain	  purposes.	  The	   redistribution	  of	  benefits	  and	  charges	   should	  consider	  additional	   funding	  
for	  urban	  rehabilitation	  and	  environmental	  purposes,	  and	  warrant	  equal	   treatment	  of	  benefits	  and	  
charges	   that	   accrue	   from	   municipal	   or	   intermunicipal	   plans.	   They	   should	   further	   consider	   the	  
creation	  of	  a	  municipal	  real	  estate	  grant	  to	  promote	  the	  rental	  market.	  
The	  non	  negotiable	  developer	  obligation	  proposed	  in	  this	  article	  fits	  these	  concerns,	  as	  it	  conveys	  a	  
new	  land	  policy	  fiscal	   instrument	  that	  enables	  the	  capture	  of	  at	  least	  part	  of	  the	  betterment	  values	  
engendered	   through	   the	   assignment	   of	   concrete	   building	   capacities	   by	   plans,	   namely	   Municipal	  
Master	   Plans,	   Urban	   Development	   Plans,	   Detail	   Plans,	   parcelling	   out	   procedures,	   or	   other	  
instruments	   of	   territorial	   management.	   Indeed	   this	   proposal	   develops	   an	   innovative	   concept	   and	  
methodology	   for	   value	   capture	   based	   on	   charging	   for	   extra	   development	   rights	   beyond	   average	  
urban	  built-­‐up	  areas,	  and	  applies	  this	  methodology	  to	  a	  detail	  plan	  of	  a	  Portuguese	  town.	  This	  levied	  
betterment	  will	   be	   afterwards	   applied	   to	   support	   infrastructure´s	   costs	   both	   specific	   to	   the	   urban	  
operation,	  and	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  general	  interest	  of	  municipality´s	  citizens.	  
	  
2.	  Theoretical	  background	  
 
An	   “unearned	   increment”	   represents	   an	   increase	   in	   land	   value	   that	   may	   even	   result	   from	   public	  
decisions	   or	   from	   the	   economic	   general	   development,	   irrespective	   of	   landowners´	   innitiatives	   or	  
investments.	  The	  “betterment”	  corresponds	  to	  the	  part	  of	  the	  “unearned	  increment”	  that	  specifically	  
accrues	  from	  public	  decisions	  on	  infrastructure	  works,	  or	  from	  land	  use	  regulations	  (land	  use	  plans	  or	  
decisions	  on	  urban	  development)	  (Alterman,	  2010,	  2011).	  
The	  concept	  of	  “value	  capture”	  is	  often	  used	  to	  designate	  a	  set	  of	  land	  use	  instruments	  that	  enable	  
the	  capture	  of	  betterments	  that	  straightly	  result	  from	  land	  use	  regulation	  or	  public	  works	  (Alterman,	  
2010,	  2011).	  Policies	  to	  recover	  betterments	  may	  be	  implemented	  either	  through	  fiscal	  mechanisms	  
(namely	   taxes,	   contributions,	   or	   exations	   charged	   to	   landowners	   or	   developers)	   or	   through	  
regulatory	   instruments	   (aimed	   at	   local	   improvements,	   namely	   provision	   of	   more	   and	   better	  
infrastructure,	  facilities	  or	  services)	  (Smolka	  and	  Amborski,	  2003).	   
Land	  value	  capture	  has	  attracted	  increasing	  attention	  by	  decision	  makers	  responsible	  for	  local	  public	  
finance,	   due	  both	   to	  decrease	   in	   incomes	   accruing	   from	   traditional	   local	   taxes	   and	   to	   the	  need	   to	  
fund	   local	   infrastructure	   through	   alternative	   means	   (Ingram	   and	   Hong,	   2012).	   A	   large	   number	   of	  
urban	  planners	  (especially	  in	  North	  and	  in	  Latin	  America)	  have	  developped	  and	  applied	  economic	  and	  
financial	   instruments	   that	   enable	   public	   bodies	   to	   fund	   infrastructure	   required	   by	   new	   urban	  
undertakings,	  namely	  through	  capture	  of	  land	  unearned	  increments,	  in	  general,	  and	  betterments,	  in	  
particular	   (Smolka	   and	   Amborski,	   2000,	   2003).	   But	   amongst	   these	   planners,	   a	   school	   of	   though	  
asserts	  that	  new	  real	  estate	  developments	  should	  pay	  for	  their	  required	  infrastructure,	  according	  to	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their	   proper	   anticipated	   benefits.	   This	   goal	   may	   be	   achieved	   through	   exations	   settled	   in	   urban	  
development	   agreements,	   which	   may	   translate	   either	   in	   impact	   contributions	   or	   in	   development	  
debits	  (Smolka	  and	  D.	  Amborski,	  2003).	  
Almost	   all	   Latin-­‐American	   countries	   have	   enforced	   non-­‐negotiable	   developer	   obligations	   -­‐	  
betterments´	   contribution	   or	   special	   assessments	   -­‐	   that	   enables	   the	   public	   sector	   to	   recover	  
betterment	   strickty	   related	   to	  public	   investments	   (Smolka	  and	  Amborski,	   2003,	  Rebelo,	  2014).	   The	  
impact	  fees	  and	  development	  charges	  have	  also	  been	  largely	  used	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  –	  
especially	   in	   the	   states	   of	   Vermont	   and	  Pennsylvania	   (Daniels,	  Daniels	   and	   Lapping,	   1986;	  Gihring,	  
1999)	  -­‐	  and	  in	  Canada	  from	  late	  1950s	  (Amborski,	  1988;	  Alshuler	  &	  Gómez-­‐Ibañez,	  1993;	  Smolka	  and	  
Amborski,	  2007),	  and	  also	  in	  Taiwan	  (Lam	  and	  Tsui,	  1998),	  Hong	  Kong,	  and	  Singapore	  (Hui,	  Ho,	  and	  
Ho,	   2004;	   Alterman,	   2011),	   and	   consist	   in	   contributions	   charged	   to	   real	   estate	   developers	   and	  
builders	   aimed	   at	   funding	   all	   or	   part	   of	   infrastructure	   costs	   associated	   to	   new	   development	  
undertakings.	   In	   many	   circumstances,	   developers	   should	   deliver	   benefits	   to	   the	   community	   as	   a	  
counterweigh	  to	  certain	  licensed	  building	  levels:	  an	  analysis	  should	  be	  assigned	  to	  each	  project,	  duly	  
explaining	   the	   betterment	   it	   entails	   (Calavita	   and	   Mallach,	   2009).	   The	   implementation	   of	   non-­‐
negotiable	  development	  obligations	  are	  prescribed	  by	  national	  or	  regional	  detailed	  legislation	  –	  such	  
is	   the	   case	   of	   the	   “community	   infrastructure	   levy”	   (England),	   the	   “tax	   d’amenagement”	   (France),	  
“cargas	   de	   urbanización,	   cesiones	   and	   reservas	   de	   suelo	   (Spain),	   “exploitatiebijdrage”	   (the	  
Netherlands),	   among	   other	   similar	   instruments	   (Gielen	   and	   van	   der	   Krabben,	   2017),	   usually	  more	  
detailed	  in	  land	  use	  and	  zoning	  local	  plans.	  
Value	  capture	  based	  on	  plans	  presents	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  advantages:	  transparence	  and	  accountability,	  
and	  faster	  implementation	  of	  urban	  development	  processes.	  This	  capture	  may	  be	  designed	  according	  
to	  plans:	  in	  such	  case	  the	  exations	  or	  linkages	  are	  computed	  either	  as	  on	  a	  per	  square	  meter	  basis,	  or	  
a	  percentage	  of	  building	  costs	  (Calavita	  and	  Mallach,	  2009).	  
In	  China	  municipalities	  buy	  agricultural	   land	  and	  pay	   for	   it,	   then	  carry	  on	   infrastructure	  works,	  and	  
sell	   it	   afterwards	   to	   developers	   as	   urban	   land	   plots	   with	   development	   licenses.	   The	   difference	  
between	  land	  urban	  and	  agricultural	  values	  is	  guided	  to	  the	  advantage	  of	  the	  municipality:	  it	  indeed	  
represents	  an	  important	  share	  of	  local	  income,	  and	  it	  pays	  for	  set	  up	  infrastructure.	  
Hong	  Kong	  has	  created	  its	  own	  wealth	  resorting	  to	  a	  value	  capture	  model	  where	  its	  public	  transports´	  
systems	   links	   together	   with	   city	   housing	   and	   trade	   requirements	   (Foley,	   2011). In	   Hong	   Kong	  
transport	  firms	  use	  the	  incomes	  that	  accrue	  from	  the	  joint	  development	  of	  housing	  communities	  and	  
trade	  areas	  around	  bus	  stops	  to	  fund	  expensive	  projects	  either	  in	  transports	  or	  in	  the	  development	  
of	  new	  cities	  (Ingram	  and	  Hong,	  2012). 
In	  India	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  states	  has	  enforced	  legislation	  that	  empowers	  local	  governments	  to	  levy	  
taxes	  for	  infrastructure´	  improvements,	  once	  infrastructure	  works	  are	  finalized	  (Walters,	  2012b). 
The	  United	   Kingdom	  has	   tried	   to	   implement	   improvement	   taxes	   in	   several	   ocasions	   (Plimmer	   and	  
McNab,	  2008;	  Booth,	  2012;	  Walters,	  2012b).	  In	  the	  first	  instance,	  the	  Land	  Commission	  Act	  of	  1967	  
proposed	  a	  tax	  rate	  of	  40%.	  In	  1975	  the	  Community	  Land	  Act	  reattempted	  to	  nationalise	  land	  urban	  
development	   values.	   Later	   on,	   a	   Development	   Land	   Tax	   of	   60%	   on	   the	   increased	   land	   value	   that	  
resulted	   from	   a	   development	   approval	   was	   enforced.	   In	   2006	   a	   Planning	   Gain	   Supplement	   was	  
proposed,	  but	  din´t	  manage	  to	  be	  approved.	  Latterly	  –	  from	  2011	  on	  –	  The	  United	  Kingdom	  started	  
the	   implementation	   of	   a	   community	   infrastructure	   levy,	   which	   main	   goal	   consisted	   in	   recovering	  
infrastructure	  investment´s	  charges	  (Booth,	  2012;	  Ingram	  and	  Hong,	  2012;	  Walters,	  2012b).	  This	  tax	  
conveys	  the	  evolution	  of	  central	  governments´	  perspective	  on	  land	  value	  capture	  –	  from	  the	  straight	  
levy	  of	  betterments	  till	   the	  traded	  settlement	  of	  contributions	  to	  support	   infrastructure´s	  provision	  
(Booth,	   2012;	   Walters,	   2012b).	   Other	   land	   value	   capture	   instruments	   are	   (Calavita	   and	   Mallach,	  
2009):	   development	   impact	   fees;	   comercial	   (job-­‐housing)	   impact	   fees;	   inclusionary	   housing;	   and	  
density	  bonuses. 
France	  currently	  applies	  a	  tax	  -­‐	  similar	  to	  the	  improvement	  tax	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  -­‐	  that	  is	  levied	  




In	  Denmark	  a	  special	  land	  development	  tax	  was	  levied	  before	  2004	  that	  required	  developers	  to	  pay	  
about	   50%	   of	   the	   betterment	   that	   accrued	   from	   zoning	   changes	   whenever	   agricultural	   land	   was	  
legally	  tranfered	  into	  an	  urban	  zone	  (Walters,	  2012b).	  
In	  Poland	  changes	  from	  agricultural	  to	  urban	  land	  uses	  may	  entail	  a	  tax	  that	  amounts	  up	  till	  30%	  of	  
the	  betterment	  when	  land	  is	  sold	  within	  a	  five-­‐year	  period	  (Walters,	  2012b). 
The	  United	  States	  of	  America	  use	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  specific	  policies	  that	  (explicitly	  or	  implicitly)	  include	  
value	   capture	   (Ingram	   and	   Hong,	   2012;	   Ko	   and	   Rosenblatt,	   2013),	   namely:	   Community	   Facilities	  
Districts	  (CFDs),	  also	  called	  Mello-­‐Roos	  Districts;	  special	  taxes;	  Business	  Improvement	  Districts	  (BIDs);	  
Tax	  Increment	  Financing	  (TIF);	  Community	  Benefits	  Agreements	  (CBAs);	  Land	  Value	  Tax;	  and	  Special	  
Assessment	  Districts	  (SAD). 
In	   Latin	   America	   have	   been	   implemented	   different	   land	   value	   capture	   initiatives	   through	  
improvements´	  taxes	  (Walters,	  2012b).	  In	  the	  state	  of	  São	  Paulo,	  in	  Brazil,	  is	  enforced	  a	  variant	  of	  the	  
improvements´	   tax:	   a	   local	   governmental	   agency	   identifies	   the	   amount	   and	   type	   of	   additional	  
development	   that	   will	   be	   licensed	   in	   a	   given	   area,	   which	   is	   then	   empowered	   to	   issue	   Additional	  
Construction	   Potential	   Certificates	   (usually	   known	  as	   CEPACs),	   and	   later	   on	   send	   them	   through	  an	  
electronic	  auction. 
In	  Argentina	  municipalities	  can	  fund	  certain	  public	  works	  through	  improvements´	  contributions	  that	  
turn	   into	   land	  value	   increments:	  governments	   identify	  certain	  categories	  of	  beneficiaries	  and	  share	  
with	  them	  building	  costs,	  in	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  estimated	  benefits	  (Rezk	  2004;	  Walters,	  2012b).	  
In	  Colombia	  improvement	  taxes	  –	  Contribución	  de	  Valorización	  -­‐	  have	  been	  most	  successfully	  used	  to	  
fund	   improvements	   in	   infrastructure	   (Borrero	   et	   al.,	   2011;	   Walters,	   L.,	   2012b).	   More	   recently	   –	  
considering	   that	   the	   cities	   that	   adopt	   urban	   development	   plans	   raise	   value	   through	   the	  
transformation	   of	   previous	   land	   agricultural	   uses	   into	   urban	   land	   uses	   –	   cities	   are	   able	   to	   capture	  
30%	  to	  50%	  of	  this	  increase	  through	  a	  tax	  called	  Participación	  en	  Plusvalias.	  
The	  instruments	  to	  indirectly	  capture	  land	  values	  generally	  arise	  upwards,	  from	  local	  policies,	  often	  
specifically	  developed	   for	   specific	   investments	  or	  undertakings	   (Alterman,	  2005,	  2011;	   Spaans,	   van	  
der	  Veen,	  and	  Janssen	  Jansen,	  2008).	  They	  are	  more	  flexible	  because	  they	  frequently	  don´t	  require	  
specific	   legislation,	   they	   overcome	   more	   efficiently	   voters´	   resistence	   to	   new	   taxes,	   are	   easily	  
aprehended	  by	  citizens	   if	  associated	   to	   the	  charges	   that	  a	  certain	  development	  entails	   to	  public	   in	  
general,	  fund	  more	  quickly	  the	  public	  needs,	  fit	  better	  communities´	  socio-­‐political	  preferences,	  and	  
don´t	  discourage	  urban	  development	  processes	  (Alterman,	  2011). 
In	  order	   to	   implement	  a	   tax	  on	   improvements	   the	   following	  administrative	  conditions	  are	  required	  
(Bahl	  and	  Wallace,	  2008;	  Walters,	  2012b):	  quantitative	  assessment	  of	  their	   impacts	  on	   land	  values;	  
identification	   of	   beneficiaries;	   and	   existence	   of	   a	   public	   organism	   and	   political	   will	   to	   efficiently	  
implement	  the	  tax.	  The	   implementation	  difficulties	   faced	  by	  this	   tax	   (Booth,	  2012;	  Walters,	  2012b)	  
turn	  up	  because	  it	  is	  hard:	  to	  grasp	  beforehand	  how	  an	  investment	  or	  land	  use	  change	  will	  affect	  its	  
value,	   to	   clearly	   point	   out	   which	   properties	   will	   be	   born	   on	   and	   who	   should	   pay	   the	   tax,	   and	   to	  
politically	  stand	  up	  for	  levies	  on	  improvements	  (Day,	  2005;	  Walters,	  2012b).	  
Land	  value	  capture	  may	  take	  place	  within	  re-­‐zoning	  contexts	  based	  on	  (specific	  or	  community)	  plans	  
(Calavita	  and	  Mallach,	  2009).	  
To	   recover	   a	   specific	   investment	   in	   infrastructure	   an	   accurate	   estimate	   of	   relevant	   charges	   is	  
required,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   identification	   of	   the	   affected	   land,	   followed	   by	   the	   alocation	   of	   a	   proper	  
share	  of	  costs	  to	  each	  land	  parcel.	  It	  is	  supposed	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  investments	  in	  infrastructure	  on	  
market	   values	   of	   affected	   properties	   is	   positive,	   but	   literature	   or	   good	   practices	   lack	   attempts	   to	  
directly	  measure	   this	   impact	   (Walters,	   2012b).	   Smolka	  and	  Amborski	   (2000)	  present	  an	   interesting	  
discussion	   on	   the	   relation	   between	   the	   land	   value	   unearned	   increments	   and	   investment	   costs	   in	  









The	  abstract	  average	  municipal	  building	  capacity/m2	  is	  first	  computed	  through	  the	  quotient	  between	  
the	   product	   of	   total	   licensed	   gross	   built	   surfaces1	   (in	  m2)	   assigned	   to	   different	   types	   of	   uses	   and	  
respective	   occupation	   and	   use	   indexes,	   weighted	   by	   corresponding	   percentages,	   and	   the	   total	  
municipal	  surface	  assigned	  to	  urban	  uses	  (Figure	  1).	  
Then	   is	  computed	   the	  concrete	  building	  capacity/m2	  of	  a	  certain	  execution	  unit	  or	   intervention	  
area	   through	   the	   quotient	   between	   the	   product	   of	   total	   licensed	   gross	   built	   surfaces	   (in	   m2)	  
assigned	   to	   different	   kinds	   of	   uses	   and	   respective	   occupation	   and	   use	   indexes,	   weighted	   by	  
corresponding	   percentages,	   and	   the	   total	   surface	   of	   the	   execution	   unit	   or	   intervention	   area	  
(according	  to	  enforced	  ordering	  plans).	  
	  
 
Figure	  1.	  Methodological	  steps	  pursued	  in	  this	  research.	  
 
The	   land	   price/m2	   according	   to	   market	   trade	   is	   estimated	   by	   the	   difference	   between	   the	  
municipal	  price/m2	  in	  the	  municipality	  under	  analysis	  (according	  to	  market	  trade	  data)	  net	  of	  the	  
average	   costs/m2	   with	   urban	   infrastructures´	   execution,	   maintenance	   and	   reinforcement,	   and	  
the	   average	   building	   costs/m2.	   An	   approach	   to	   the	   betterment	   values/m2	   is	   reckoned	   through	  
the	  difference	  between	  this	   land	  price/m2	   for	  each	  kind	  of	  use	  and	  the	  corresponding	  tributary	  
patrimonial	   value	   of	   buildable	   land	   according	   to	   the	   enforced	   Real	   Estate	  Municipal	   Tax	   Code	  
(IMI,	  in	  Portuguese	  language).	  
The	  product	  between	  this	  surplus	  value/m2	  and	  the	  concrete	  building	  capacities	  of	  the	  execution	  
unit	  or	   intervention	  area	  under	  analysis	   for	  each	  kind	  of	  use,	  summed	  up	  to	  the	  whole	  plots	  of	  
the	  urban	   intervention,	   for	  all	   the	  anticipated	  uses,	   finally	   gives	   the	  estimated	   total	   amount	  of	  
betterment	  values.	  
Finally	   the	   potential	   capture	   of	   betterment	   amounts	   to	   20%	   of	   the	   sum	   total	   of	   the	   previous	  
values.	  Reflections	  are	  pursued	  concerning	  the	  social	  reassignment	  of	  surplus	  values	  engendered	  
by	  the	  applied	  urban	  plans.	  
	  
	  
4.	  Case	  study	  
	  
                                                
1	  According	  to	  Urban	  Development	  Plans,	  Detail	  Plans,	  or	  parcelling	  out	  procedures.	  
New land value capture 
instrument
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4.1.	  The	  Urban	  Development	  Plan	  of	  the	  Planning	  Unit	  UP	  11	  in	  Lagoa	  
	  
Lagoa	   is	  a	  Municipality	  that	   locates	   in	  Faro	  district	   (Portugal)	   (Figure	  2).	   It	  has	  a	  surface	  of	  88,3	  
km2	  and	  holds	  a	  population	  of	  22	  791	  inhabitants.	  The	  tertiary	  sector	  is	  responsible	  for	  84,8%	  of	  
employment	  in	  this	  municipality,	  slightly	  higher	  than	  the	  homologous	  employment	  in	  the	  Algarve	  
region	  (82,5%),	  and	  in	  continental	  Portugal	  (65,3%)(INE,	  2011a).	  
	  
  
Figure	  2.	  Lagoa	  Municipality	  (Algarve)	  (source:	  http://www.google.com).	  
 
In	  Lagoa	  Municipality	  are	  enforced	  the	  Municipal	  Master	  Plan	  of	  Lagoa2;	  the	  Urban	  Development	  
Plan	  of	  the	  Planning	  Unit	  1	  –	  UP	  1	  from	  Ferragudo	  to	  Calvário3;	  the	  Urban	  Development	  Plan	  of	  
the	  Touristic	  Capacity	  Area	  of	  the	  Planning	  Unit	  12	  -­‐	  UP	  124;	  the	  Urban	  Development	  Plan	  of	  the	  
Planning	  Unit	  11	  -­‐	  UP	  115;	  the	  Urban	  Development	  Plan	  of	  the	  Town	  of	  Lagoa6;	  the	  Ordering	  Plan	  
of	  the	  seashore	  of	  Burgau-­‐Vilamoura7;	  the	  Regional	  Plan	  of	  Territorial	  Ordering	  PROT	  -­‐	  Algarve8;	  
the	  Plan	  of	  the	  Hydrological	  Basin	  of	  the	  Algarve	  Streams9;	  the	  Regional	  Plan	  of	  Forest	  Ordering	  
(PROF)	   of	   Algarve10;	   the	   Natura	   2000	   Network11;	   the	   Partial	   suspension	   of	   the	   Regional	   Forest	  
Ordering	  Plan	  (PROF)	  of	  Algarve12;	  and	  the	  Management	  Plan	  of	  the	  Hydrological	  Basins	  that	  take	  
part	  in	  the	  Hydrological	  Basin	  8	  (RH8)	  –	  PGBH	  of	  the	  Algarve	  Streams13.	  
The	  Municipal	  Master	   Plan	   of	   Lagoa	   aims	   at	   ordering	   respective	   territory	   to	   assure	   a	   balanced	  
socio-­‐economic	   development,	   stating	   rules	   for	   a	   rational	   use	   of	   spaces,	   and	   promoting	   the	  
management	  of	  resources	  and	  heritage	  assets	  to	  raise	  population´s	  quality	  of	  life.	  
The	   municipal	   built-­‐up	   areas	   locate	   in	   the	   urban	   developed	   and	   developable	   zones	   of	   Lagoa,	  
Estômbar,	  Porches,	  Aldeia	  de	  Luís	  Francisco,	  Ferragudo,	  Corgos,	  Bela	  Vista,	  Parchal,	  Mexilhoeira	  
da	   Carregação,	   Pateiro,	   Calvário,	   Carvoeiro,	   Poço	   Partido,	   Sobral	   and	   Torrinha.	   Their 
corresponding	  planning	  and	  management	  operational	  units	   -­‐	  UP	  1,	  UP	  2,	  UP	  3,	  UP	  4,	  UP	  8,	  and	  
UP	  9	  -­‐	  may	  undergo	  changes.	  	  
The	   surfaces	   occupied	   by	   touristic	   uses	   (duly	   approved	   by	   public	   entities)	   and	   the	   interstitial	  
adjacent	   areas	   make	   up	   the	   touristic	   occupation	   areas,	   that	   are	   identified	   in	   the	   Municipal	  
Master	  Plan	  as	  planning	  units	  UP	  7,	  UP	  10,	  and	  UP	  13.	  
The	  identified	  Touristic	  Capacity	  Areas,	  by	  their	  turn,	  include	  the	  Touristic	  Development	  Nuclei	  in	  
the	  planning	  and	  management	  operational	  units	  UP	  5,	  UP	  6,	  UP	  11	  and	  UP	  12.	  Until	  the	  approval	  
of	   the	   Touristic	  Development	  Nuclei	   –	   assigned	   to	   25%	  of	   the	   Touristic	   Capacity	  Areas	   -­‐,	   these	  
                                                
2	  RCM	  nº	  29/94;	  Aviso	  nº	  26197/2008;	  Aviso	  nº	  3872/2012	  
3	  RCM	  nº	  126/99;	  Edital	  613/2009	  
4	  Declaração	  nº	  56/2008	  
5	  Aviso	  nº	  44845/2008	  
6	  Aviso	  nº11622/2008	  
7	  RCM	  nº	  33/99	  
8	  RCM	  nº	  102/2007;	  RCM	  nº	  188/2007	  
9	  DR	  12/2002	  
10	  DR	  nº	  17/2006	  
11	  RCM	  nº	  115-­‐A/2008	  
12	  Portaria	  nº	  78/2013	  
13	  RCM	  nº	  16-­‐E/2013 
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areas	  should	  adopt	  the	  regime	  of	  land	  use,	  occupation	  and	  transformation	  stated	  in	  the	  ordering	  
plans,	  in	  the	  restrictions	  plan,	  and	  in	  the	  Municipal	  Master	  Plan	  of	  Lagoa.	  
According	   to	   this	   Municipal	   Master	   Plan,	   the	   Touristic	   Development	   Nuclei	   mustn´t	   embrace	  
natural	  reserves	  or	  parks,	  the	  touristic	  developments	  should	  be	  solely	  targeted	  to	  touristic	  uses	  
(excluding	   incompatible	   occupations)	   and	   conform	   to	   high	   quality	   standards,	   providing	   leisure	  
facilities,	   supporting	   internal	   and	   sharing	   municipal	   infrastructure´s	   costs.	   Each	   Touristic	  
Development	   Nucleus	   may	   embrace	   several	   touristic	   undertakings,	   served	   by	   the	   same	  
infrastructure´s	   network,	  whereas	   the	  occupied	   land	  plots	   should	  belong	   to	   the	   same	  Touristic	  
Capacity	  Areas.	  
The	  Urban	  Development	  Plan	  of	  the	  Planning	  Unit	  11	  (UP	  11)	  is	  a	  Touristic	  Capacity	  Area	  that	  can	  
embrace	   one	   or	   more	   Touristic	   Development	   Nuclei	   (NDT).	   Its	   intervention	   area	   –	   the	   whole	  
operational	   unit	   –	   locates	   between	   Marinha	   beach	   and	   Cabo	   Carvoeiro,	   and	   takes	   up	   401,6	  
hectares	   in	   the	   parishes	   of	   Lagoa	   and	   Carvoeiro,	   in	   the	   municipality	   of	   Lagoa.	   This	   Urban	  
Development	   Plan	   sets	   land	   occupation,	   use	   and	   transformation	   capacities	   in	   its	   intervention	  
area	  (through	  corresponding	  urban	  parameters)	  (Figure	  3).	  
	  
	  
Figure	  3.	  Zoning	  plan	  of	  the	  planning	  unit	  UP	  11	  (Lagoa)	  (source:	  https://mapas.cm-­‐
lagoa.pt/docs/UP_11_ZONAMENTO.pdf)	  
	  
The	  settled	  specific	  goals	  of	  the	  Touristic	  Capacity	  Area	  of	  UP	  11	  consist	  in	  the	  implementation	  –	  
through	   correspondent	   execution	   units	   -­‐	   of	   two	   Touristic	   Development	   Nuclei,	   East	   NDT	   and	  
West	   NDT.	   Both	   should	   respect	   the	   ecological	   structure,	   as	   well	   as	   natural	   and	   cultural	  
landscape.	   The	   total	   surfaces	   assigned	   to	   both	   Touristic	   Development	   Nuclei	   (997	   737	   m2)	  
mustn’t	  exceed	  25%	  of	  the	  whole	  surface	  of	  UP	  11	  settled	  in	  the	  Municipal	  Master	  Plan	  of	  Lagoa	  
(4	  016	  158	  m2):	  East	  NDT	  has	  a	  surface	  of	  741	  890	  m2	  and	  West	  NDT	  has	  a	  surface	  to	  255	  847	  m2.	  
The	  intervention	  area	  of	  UP	  11	  encompasses	  both	  urban	  land	  (developed	  land	  and	  land	  which	  urban	  
development	  may	   be	   programed)	   and	   rural	   land.	   Developed	   urban	   land	   includes	   the	   urban	   areas	  
outside	   the	   Touristic	   Development	   Nuclei	   settled	   in	   the	   Municipal	   Master	   Plan:	   the	   consolidated	  
urban	  area	  of	  Benagil,	  the	  touristic-­‐urban	  area	  at	  Carvalho	  beach´s	  north	  (Clube	  Atlântico),	  and	  two	  
touristic-­‐urban	   areas	   located	   near	   Alfanzina.	   Their	   building	   regime	   should	   conform	   to	   respective	  
building	  licences	  where	  parcelling	  out	  operations	  are	  enforced.	  Land	  which	  urban	  development	  may	  
be	  programed	  includes	  the	  new	  touristic	  areas	  inside	  both	  East	  NDT	  and	  West	  NDT,	  and	  in	  all	  mustn´t	  
surpass	  30%	  of	  the	  total	  surface	  of	  the	  Touristic	  Development	  Nuclei.	  The	  East	  Touristic	  Development	  
Nucleus	  structures	   into	  N1	  and	  N2	  planning	  and	  management	  operational	   sub-­‐units;	  and	   the	  West	  





All	  touristic	  undertakings	  in	  each	  programed	  urban	  development	  land	  Touristic	  Development	  Nucleus	  
must	   conform	   to	   four-­‐star	  or	   higher	   category.	  A	  maximum	  of	   1	   279	  beds	   are	   assigned	   to	   the	  East	  
Touristic	  Development	  Nuclei,	  whereas	  a	  maximum	  of	  441	  beds	  are	  assigned	  to	  the	  West	  Touristic	  
Development	  Nuclei,	  adding	  up	  1	  720	  beds.	  
Only	   hotels	   and/or	   further	   touristic	   facilities	   are	   allowed	   in	   programed	   urban	   development	   land	  
where	   the	   Ordering	   Plan	   of	   the	   seashore	   of	   Burgau-­‐Vilamoura	   is	   enforced14.	   Land	   which	   urban	  
development	  may	  be	  programed	  in	  Touristic	  Development	  Nuclei	  should	  further	  observe	  the	  building	  
regime	   of	   respective	   planning	   and	   management	   operational	   sub-­‐units,	   according	   to	   the	  
classifications	  licensed	  in	  touristic	  undertakings.	  
	  
4.2.	  Application	  of	  the	  new	  land	  value	  capture	  instrument	  to	  the	  Planning	  Unit	  11	  in	  Lagoa	  
	  
The	   estimation	   of	   the	   annual	   average	   gross	   built	   surface	   in	   the	  municipality	   of	   Lagoa	   resorted	   to	  
statistical	   data	   collected	   for	   a	   four-­‐year	   period,	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   fluctuations	   of	   situation.	   The	  
average	  gross	  built	   surface	   (for	  developed	  and	  developable	  urban	   land)	   (6)	   is	  given	  by	   the	  product	  
between	   each	   year´s	   finished	   buildings15	   (1),	   the	   average	   number	   of	   storeys	   per	   building	   (2),	   the	  
average	  number	  of	  dwellings	  per	  storey	  (3),	  the	  average	  number	  of	  compartments	  per	  dwelling	  (4),	  
and	  the	  average	  liveable	  surface	  per	  compartment	  (5)	  (m2),	  divided	  by	  0,65	  (as	  the	  liveable	  surface	  
represents	  around	  65%	  of	  the	  gross	  built	  surface)	  (INE,	  2009,	  2010,	  2011b,	  2012)	  (Table	  1).	  
	  
Table	  1.	  Estimation	  of	  the	  annual	  gross	  built	  surface	  in	  the	  Municipality	  of	  Lagoa	  for	  2008,	  2009,	  2010	  
and	  2011,	  and	  corresponding	  annual	  average	  value	  
. 
	  
The	   average	   annual	   costs	   with	   infrastructures´	   execution,	   maintenance	   and	   reinforcement	   was	  
computed	   resorting	   to	   the	   data	   of	   the	  municipal	   amortization	   and	   provision	  maps	   respecting	   the	  
assets	  within	  the	  public	  domain	  –	  other	  construction	  and	  urban	  infrastructure,	  for	  2009,	  2010,	  2011	  
and	  2012.	  The	  average	  annual	   investment	  amounted	  to	  34	  044	  069	  €	  (Câmara	  Municipal	  de	  Lagoa,	  
2009,	  2010,	  2011,	  2012),	  thus	  it	  leads	  to	  an	  estimation	  of	  705,2	  €/m2	  average	  annual	  infrastructure	  
costs	  (Table	  2).	  
 




For	   each	   year,	   the	   transaction	   value/m2	   (€/m2)	   in	   Lagoa	  Municipality	   (3)	   is	   computed	   through	   the	  
quotient	  between	  the	  value	  of	  land	  property	  transactions	  (1)	  (INE,	  2009,	  2010,	  2011b,	  2012)	  and	  the	  
                                                
14	  Except	  in	  the	  “nonaedificandi”	  area	  depicted	  in	  the	  zoning	  plan	  in	  the	  East	  NDT	  (where	  buildings	  are	  forbidden).	  
15	  It	  corresponds	  to	  the	  sum	  of	  new	  buildings,	  and	  buildings´	  enlargement,	  changes	  and/or	  reconstruction.	  
2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Average
Total number of finished buildings (1) 228 137 114 64 543 136
Average number of storeys per building (2) 2,7 2,5 2,4 2,2 9,8 2,5
Average number of dwellings per storey (3) 1,2 1,6 0,7 0,5 4,0 1,0
Average number of compartments per building (4) 4,3 4,4 5,5 5,8 20,0 5,0
Average liveable surface per compartment (m2) (5) 17,3 17,5 19,8 21,6 76,2 19,0
Total gross built surface (m2) (6)=(1)x(2)x(3)x(4)x(5)/0,65 82.539,8 64.916,9 32.087,0 13.568,8 193.112 48.278
Investments in urban infrastructures´ execution, maintenance and 
reinforcement 
2009 2010 2011 2012
Annual amortization of urban infraestruture (€) 26.399.063 31.439.028 36.570.644 41.767.542
Annual average investment (€)
Annual average gross built surface (m2)





total	   gross	   built	   surface	   (2)	   (Table	   3).	   Buildable	   land	  price	   per	  m2	   according	   to	  market	   trade	   (6)	   is	  
given	  by	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  transaction	  value/m2	  (3)	  and	  the	  average	  construction	  costs/m2	  
16	  (4)	  and	  the	  average	  urban	  infrastructures´	  execution,	  maintenance	  and	  reinforcement	  costs/m2	  (5).	  
	  
Table	  3.	  Price	  of	  buildable	  land/m2	  in	  the	  municipality	  of	  Lagoa,	  in	  2008,	  2009,	  2010	  and	  2011	  
 
 
The	  average	  municipal	   land	  price	  of	  buildable	   land/m2	  based	  on	   town	  property	   trade	   is	   computed	  
through	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  different	  land	  prices/m2	  for	  each	  planning	  and	  management	  sub-­‐operational	  
unit	  and	  for	  each	  type	  of	  use	  within	  the	  Planning	  Unit	  11,	  assuming	  that	  respective	  contribution	  for	  
this	   price	   is	   proportional	   to	   the	   licensed	   gross	   built	   surface	   for	   profitable	   uses.	   So	   the	   gross	   built	  
surface	   assigned	   to	   profitable	   uses	   (m2)	   was	   identified	   in	   each	   area	   of	   Lagoa	  Municipality	   (where	  
apply	   different	   planning	   instruments	   and	   urban	   parameters).	   The	   product	   between	   the	   price	   of	  
buildable	   land/m2	   and	   respective	   net	   land	  use	   index/m2	  of	   land	  was	   next	   computed.	   The	   share	   of	  
each	  area	  in	  the	  average	  land	  price/m2	  each	  year	  is	  given	  by	  the	  product	  of	  the	  previous	  value	  and	  
respective	   percentage	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   maximum	   gross	   built	   surface	   licensed	   in	   the	   total	   urban	  
developed	  and	  developable	  municipal	  areas.	  These	  parcels	  are,	   then,	  summed	  up	   for	  all	   the	  areas,	  
each	  year,	  what	  leads	  to	  721,9	  euros/m2	  for	  municipal	  land	  price,	  on	  average,	  per	  year.	  
The	  application	  of	  the	  parameters	  and	  formula	  settled	  in	  the	  Real	  Estate	  Municipal	  Tax	  Code	  in	  each	  
area	   within	   Lagoa	   Municipality	   lead	   to	   an	   average	   annual	   tributary	   patrimonial	   value	   of	   56,1	  
euros/m2	  of	  buildable	  land	  (based	  on	  corresponding	  values	  for	  2008,	  2009,	  2010	  and	  2011).	  
The	  betterment	  values	  ascribable	  to	  each	  planning	  and	  management	  operational	  sub-­‐unit	  and	  to	  
each	  kind	  of	   land	  touristic	  profitable	  use	  was,	  then,	  reckoned	  through	  the	  product	  between	  the	  
homologous	   licensed	   gross	   build	   surface	   and	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   annual	   land	   price/m2	  
based	  on	  market	  trade	  (721,9	  €/m2)	  and	  the	  corresponding	  price	  based	  on	  the	  application	  of	  the	  
Real	  Estate	  Municipal	  Tax	  Code	  to	  Lagoa	  municipality	   (56,1	  €/m2)	   (Table	  4).	  The	  proposed	  20%	  
tax	  aimed	  at	  social	  purposes	  is,	  then,	  applied	  to	  the	  intervention	  area	  of	  this	  Development	  Plan,	  
thus	   the	   potential	   collectable	   value	   amounts	   to	   12	   764	   718	   €,	   what	   represents	   37,5%	   of	   the	  
annual	  municipal	  average	  investment	  in	  urban	  infrastructures.	  
	  
Table	  4.	  Average	  betterment	  and	  corresponding	  20%	  tax	  on	  these	  surplus	  values	  for	  all	  the	  planning	  and	  
management	  operational	  sub-­‐units	  and	  respective	  profitable	  touristic	  uses	  in	  the	  Planning	  Unit	  11	  of	  Lagoa.	  
  
                                                
16	  These	  costs	  are	  issued	  in	  the	  governmental	  orders	  that	  render	  applicable	  the	  article	  39th	  of	  the	  Real	  Estate	  Municipal	  Tax	  
Code	  enforced	   in	  2008,	  2009,	  2010	  and	  2011	  (Portaria	  nº	  16-­‐A/2008;	  Portaria	  nº	  1545/2008;	  Portaria	  nº	  1456/2009;	  and	  
Portaria	  nº	  1330/2010,	  respectively). 
2008 2009 2010 2011
Total value of town property trade (€) (1) 101.687.923 92.541.438 93.778.000 103.169.000
Gross built surface (m2) (2) 82.539,8 64.916,9 32.087,0 13.568,8
Transaction value/m2 (€/m2) (3)=(1)/(2) 1.232,0 1.425,5 2.922,6 7.603,4
Construction costs/m2 (4)
Urban infrastructure costs/m2 (5)







5.	  Conclusions	  and	  final	  reflections	  
	  
It	  is	  expected	  that	  this	  article	  somehow	  contributes	  to	  the	  debate	  towards	  international	  comparative	  
research	  on	  developer	  obligations.	  This	  contribution	  fits	  five	  important	  perspectives	  
First	   of	   all,	   it	   presents	   the	   legislative	   basis	   of	   the	   recently	   approved	   Portuguese	   Law	   on	   land,	  
territorial	  ordering	  and	  urban	  development	  policy,	   that	   frames	  a	   set	  of	   legal	  principles	   required	  so	  
that	   landowners	   and	   other	   public	   and/or	   private	   stakeholders	   can	   develop	   their	   lands.	   This	   law	  
remmits,	  however,	  to	  more	  territorialy	  specific	  plans,	  where	  the	  design	  and	  implementation	  of	  non-­‐
negociable	   developer	   obligations	   of	   strong	   financial	   character	   are	   presented	   in	  more	   detail.	   It	   still	  
leaves	  way	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  instrument	  to	  fit	  landowners´	  ou	  developers´	  interests,	  settled	  on	  a	  more	  
case-­‐by-­‐case	   tradable	   way,	   thus	   not	   resulting	   from	   a	   normative	   unilateral	   decision,	   but	   instead	  
gathering	  greater	  support	  from	  all	  the	  parts	  involved	  (including	  the	  proper	  population).	  	  
Secondly,	  the	  legitimation	  basis	  for	  the	  instrument	  proposed	  in	  this	  article	  may,	  also,	  found	  on	  local	  
development	   policies	   and	   strategies,	   thus	   focusing	   in	   the	   capacities	   that	   tourism	   high	   quality	  
activities	  bring	   to	   the	   referred	  municipality	  and	   to	   its	  economic	  and	   financial	   sustainability.	  Within	  
this	  scope,	  detail	  plans	  can	  specify	  the	  amounts	  that	  should	  be	  collected	  through	  this	  non-­‐negotiable	  
developer	  obligation	  to	  cover	  at	  least	  part	  of	  infrastructure	  costs	  (possibly	  extending	  to	  other	  social	  
concerns	  such	  as	  social	  housing).	  This	  instrument	  can	  also	  be	  used	  complementary	  with	  binding	  land	  
lending,	  already	  supposedly	  settled	  in	  detail	  plans.	  
Thirdly,	   this	   article	   and	   the	   proposed	   instrument	   also	   stress	   the	   role	   that	   negotiable	   developer	  
obligations	   pursue	   in	   municipal	   financial	   health,	   pointing	   out	   an	   important	   contribution	   to	   the	  
municipal	   budget,	   complementing	   other	   funding	   traditional	   sources	   such	   as	   taxes	   (increasingly	  
difficult	  to	  support	   in	  economic	  and	   in	  political	  grounds).	  They	  are	  framed	  into	  the	  rationale	  –	  that	  
underlies	   the	   current	   legislation	   –	   that	   stands	   for	   a	   new	   paradigm	   of	   municipal	   economic	   and	  
financial	   sustainability.	   This	   non-­‐negotiable	   developer	   obligation	   has,	   thus,	   the	   public	   purpose	   to	  
contribute	  to	  build	  the	  infrastructure	  required	  by	  the	  touristic	  operation,	  and	  to	  keep	  and	  reinforce	  
the	  already	  existent	  infrastructure	  in	  more	  traditional	  settlements	  within	  the	  municipality.	  So	  a	  logic	  
or	  nexus	  exists	  that	  relates	  the	  non-­‐negotiable	  developer	  obligation	  to	  subsequent	  improvements	  in	  
urban	   infrastructure	   levels,	  promoting	  the	  overall	  population´s	  quality	  of	   life.	  A	  deep	  reflection	  has	  
been	   devoted	   to	   the	   economic	   and	   financial	   sustainability	   of	   urban	   development,	   and	   the	   new	  
legislation	   recommends	   the	   development	   of	   technical	   studies	   as	   a	   pre-­‐requisite	   to	   support	   the	  
approval	  of	  plans.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  proper	  plan	  should	  assure	  that	  the	  collected	  levies	  won´t	  be	  used	  
for	  any	  other	  purposes	   that	   the	   initially	   settled	   in	  plans.	  The	  proposed	   instrument	   is	  based	  on	   the	  
application	   of	   a	   proportionality	  model	   (more	   fair	   and	   equitative,	   as	   it	   prevents	   an	   umbalanced	   or	  
Classification
N.1 Lodging establishments (Hotels) 30.000 15.000 9.987.000 1.997.400
Lodging establishmentso (Hotels, 
Serviced Flats or Inns)
Lodging complementary means 
(Holiday Villages)
221.050 71.510 47.411.618 9.482.324
P.1 Lodging establishments (Hotels) 10.000 5.000 3.329.000 665.800
Lodging establishmentso (Hotels, 
Serviced Flats or Inns)
Lodging complementary means 
(Holiday Villages)
76.754 24.650 16.411.970 3.282.394





P.2 66.754 19.650 13.082.970 2.616.594
Total (West NDT)
























arbitrary	   treatment	   of	   developers	   in	   relation	   to	   one	   another),	   applied	   to	   20%	   of	   the	   value	  
corresponding	   to	   the	   building	   capacity	   settled	   through	   urban	   parameters	   in	   applicable	   territorial	  
plans.	  
Finally,	   this	  proposal	   fits	  the	  current	  debate	  on	  the	   ‘incidence’	  of	  developer	  obligations,	  as	  far	  as	   it	  
raises	  the	  question	  on	  when	  is	  the	  right	  moment	  to	  apply	  this	  instrument.	  In	  this	  case	  it	  is	  proposed	  
that	  this	  non-­‐negotiable	  developer	  obligation	  should	  be	  applied	  before	  the	  urban	  development,	  but	  
the	  existence	  of	  a	  negotiation	  margin	  can	  still	  assure	  the	  definition	  of	  distinct	  application	  moments,	  
according	   to	  construction	  and	   transaction	  steps,	  always	  after	  a	  clear	  definition	  of	  urban	   indexes	   in	  
plans.	  Considering	  this	  is	  but	  a	  proposal,	  only	  its	  practical	  application	  will	  support	  the	  monitoring	  of	  
developers´	  behaviours	  once	  dealing	  with	  distinct	  moments	  of	  obligations´	  collection.	  
	  
Through	  the	  objective	  quantification	  of	  the	  concrete	  betterments	  that	  derive	  from	  urban	  operations	  
and	   from	   municipal	   planning	   decisions	   this	   new	   developer	   obligation,	   thus,	   supports	   the	  
reinforcement	   of	   municipal	   finance	   and	   subsequent	   economic	   and	   financial	   sustainability,	   the	  
clarification	  of	   the	  origins	  and	  applications	  of	   funds	   that	  accrue	   from	  urban	  development,	   and	   the	  
allocation	   of	   these	   surplus	   values	   for	   the	   population´s	   general	   social	   interest	   and	   not	   for	   private-­‐
oriented	  specific	   interests.	   It	   seeks,	  above	  all,	   a	   fair	  equity	  among	   the	  whole	  population	   living	   in	  a	  
certain	  Municipality,	  in	  what	  concerns	  the	  distribution	  of	  costs	  and	  benefits	  that	  accrue	  from	  urban	  
development	   operations,	   thus	   releasing	   most	   citizens	   from	   fiscal	   overburdens,	   as	   well	   as	   from	  
increases	  in	  building	  costs	  (Hong,	  1998;	  Smolka	  and	  D.	  Amborski,	  2003).	  
This	   new	   territorial	  management	   tool	   takes	   on	   a	   general	   character,	   and	   can	   be	   further	   applied	   to	  
other	  municipalities	  and	  intervention	  areas	  of	  Municipal	  Master	  Plans,	  Urban	  Development	  Plans	  or	  
Detail	  Plans,	  as	  it	  grounds	  on	  data	  and	  methodologies	  that	  support	  inter-­‐municipal	  comparisons.	  
To	   sum	   up,	   it	   can	   be	   concluded	   that	   this	   new	   instrument	   will	   substantially	   support	   the	   urban	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